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Improved Efficiency Guarantees in Auctions with Budgets
Pinyan Lu∗ Tao Xiao†
Abstract
We study the efficiency guarantees in the simple auction environment where the auction-
eer has one unit of divisible good to be distributed among a number of budget constrained
agents. With budget constraints, the social welfare cannot be approximated by a better
factor than the number of agents by any truthful mechanism. Thus, we follow a recent work
by Dobzinski and Leme [9] to approximate the liquid welfare, which is the welfare of the
agents each capped by her/his own budget. We design a new truthful auction with an ap-
proximation ratio of
√
5+1
2
≈ 1.618, improving the best previous ratio of 2 when the budgets
for agents are public knowledge and their valuation is linear (additive). In private budget
setting, we propose the first constant approximation auction with approximation ratio of 34.
Moreover, this auction works for any valuation function. Previously, only O(log n) approx-
imation was known for linear and decreasing marginal (concave) valuations, and O(log2 n)
approximation was known for sub-additive valuations.
1 Introduction
We consider a simple auction environment: the auctioneer has certain amount of divisible
good to be distributed among a number of n agents. Since the good is divisible, without loss
of generality, we can always assume that it is of one unit. Each agent i ∈ [n] has a valuation
function vi(·) for the good (willingness-to-pay) and a budget Bi to indicate the maximum
amount of money she/he is able to pay to the auctioneer (ability-to-pay). We always assume
that the valuation vi(·) is private information for agent i and we shall study both public budget
model where the budgets are public knowledge to the auctioneer and private budget model
where budget Bi is also private information for agent i. Upon receiving the bids, the auction
allocates xi ≥ 0 unit of the good to agent i and charge her/him pi ≥ 0 amount of money. Then
the utility of agent i is vi(xi)− pi if pi ≤ Bi; otherwise her/his utility is −∞ since she/he does
not have enough money to pay. We call an auction truthful or incentive compatible if it is always
a dominant strategy for every bidder i to submit her/his true private information. We say a
randomized auction is universally truthful if it is a probabilistic distribution over deterministic
truthful auctions. The auction is budget feasible if we always have pi ≤ Bi for a truth-telling
agent i.
If there is no budget constraint, the remarkable VCG auction [6,15,19] is a truthful auction
to achieve optimal social welfare. However, budget constraints for agents are very common in
real life. For high value items such as spectrum, this is due to the ability-to-pay: an agent who
values the item very high may not have enough money to pay it; even for relatively low value
items such as key words auction for search engine, budget is also the first thing to concern for
advertisers, since the volume for the auction could be very large, and a budget is used for risk
control. The existence of budget brings in a huge challenge to the design of auctions and even
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theoretical impossibility results especially when social warfare is the objective. In particular,
no truthful auction can approximate social welfare by a better factor than the number of agents
even with publicly known budget constraints and linear valuation functions. The main reason is
that we cannot truthfully allocate a significant amount of good to agents with very high values
but small budgets.
To give a more realistic benchmark for social welfare, a new notion called liquid welfare was
proposed by Dobzinski and Leme [9] as an alternative quantifiable measure for social efficiency.
It is defined to be
W (x) =
∑
i
min{vi(xi), Bi}.
Basically, each agent’s utility is capped by her/his budget. Therefore, an agent with high value
but small budget cannot contribute much to liquid welfare. This is a reasonable measure as
argued in the paper [9]: “efficiency should be measured only with respect to the funds available
to the bidder at the time of the auction, and not the additional liquidity he might gain after
receiving the goods in the auction”. This is also the maximum amount of revenue an omniscient
seller would be able to extract from a certain instance. More justification for this measure can
be found in the paper [9].
With respect to this optimal liquid welfare objective, their paper gave two truthful auctions
both with approximation ratio of 2 in the public budget model with linear (additive) valuation
functions and proved a lower bound of 43 in this same setting. They explicitly asked whether
one can have a truthful auction that provides an approximation ratio better than 2 in this
simple setting. For the more challenging private budget model, they provided an O(log n)
approximation truthful auction for linear and decreasing marginal (concave) valuations, and
an O(log2 n) approximation auction for sub-additive valuations. The main open question is
whether a constant approximation exists or not. This was not known even for simple linear
valuation functions.
1.1 Our Results and Techniques
In this paper, we answer both of their open questions affirmatively. For the public budget
setting and linear valuations, we design a new truthful auction with an approximation ratio
of ϕ =
√
5+1
2 ≈ 1.618, where ϕ is the golden ratio (i.e. the positive solution for the equation
t2 = t+ 1). For the private budget setting, we design the first constant approximation auction
with an approximation ratio of 34. More importantly, our auction works for all valuation
functions, not necessary linear, concave or sub-additive. This is a rather surprising result and
this generality makes the auction applicable in many different scenarios.
Our design techniques are also new. For the 2 approximation auction proposed in [9], the
rough idea is to use a uniform market clearing price to sell the item to agents. Their ratio
of 2 is tight for their mechanism even for two agents. The bad case happens when one agent
has very high value but limited budget while the other agent has a relatively lower value but
enough budget. In the optimal allocation, the first agent gets very little share of the good, but
this cannot be archived by a uniform pricing scheme. The high level idea of our mechanism is
that an agent can pay certain uniform price per unit but only use up certain fraction of her/his
budget. In order to use up more of her/his budget, she/he needs to pay higher price per unit.
By this mechanism, an agent with high value but limited budget will still use up all her/his
budget but get less share of the good.
Our above mechanism crucially uses the fact that the auctioneer knows the budget for each
agent. For the private budget setting, we go back to the uniform pricing scheme. However, we
do not know how to compute a good global uniform price truthfully in private budget setting.
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To overcome this, we make use of random sampling, one of the most powerful techniques in
truthful mechanism design [1,13,14]. We randomly divide the agents into two groups, compute
the optimal liquid welfare for one group and use this as a guide to charge agents in the other
group.
In order to make this random sampling auction work, the contribution in an optimal solution
from different groups should be relatively balanced. In particular, if most of the contribution
is from one single agent, random sampling does not work. Therefore, random sampling is
usually combined with a Vickrey auction [1, 5] which works well in this unbalanced case. We
also combine a Vickrey auction here for the modified valuation min{vi(1), Bi}. This Vickrey
auction was also mentioned in [9] and was claimed to be truthful there. However, we notice that
there is a subtle issue due to budget constraint and tie-breaking which makes the auction not
truthful. To overcome this, we modify the Vickrey auction in which the winner (with highest
value) need to pay a bit higher than the second highest value. In the case that the two highest
values of the agents are very close to each other, the auction simply refuse to sell the item. We
also design another version of modified Vickrey auction which works well when the two highest
values are very close to each other. We think that this observation of untruthfulness and these
modifications of Vickrey auction are of independent interest.
1.2 Related Work
Due to its practical relevance, many theoretical investigations have been devoted to analyzing
auctions for budget constrained agents, especially in direction of optimal auction design which
tries to maximize the revenue for the auctioneer [2, 3, 7, 11]. For social efficiency, a number of
previous works focus on the solution concept of Pareto Efficiency, which exist for the public
budget model but not for private budget model [8, 12].
Similar alternative quantifiable measures for efficiency for budget constrained agents were
also studied in [7, 18] but for different solution concepts.
Another related topic is to study budget feasible mechanism design for reversal auction
where the budget constrained buyer is the auctioneer rather than a bidder. This model was first
proposed and studied by Singer [17]. Since then, several improvements have been obtained [1,
4, 10].
2 Public Budgets
In this section, we consider the setting that agents’ budgets are public information to the
auctioneer, and the valuation function for each agent is linear. To simplify the notations, in this
section we will use vi to denote value per unit for agent i and thus vi(xi) = vixi. Without loss
of generality, we assume that there are n agents with values v1 ≥ . . . ≥ vn and corresponding
budgets B1, . . . , Bn. Let ϕ =
√
5+1
2 which is the golden ratio (i.e. the positive solution for the
equation t2 = t+ 1).
For public budget and linear valuations model, it becomes a single dimensional parameter
mechanism design problem with parameter v = (v1, v2, . . . , vn), thus an auction can be charac-
terized by allocation rule x : Rn+ → R
n
+ and payment rule p : R
n
+ → R
n
+ that maps v to a vector
of allocations x(v) and a vector of payments p(v). We present the Myerson’s Lemma [16],
which is a powerful tool in these settings.
Lemma 2.1. A deterministic mechanism, with allocation and payment rule x,p respectively, is
truthful if and only if for each bidder i and each v−i, the following conditions hold:
1. Monotone Allocation: xi(vi, v−i) ≤ xi(v′i, v−i) for all v
′
i ≥ vi;
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2. The payments are such that: pi(vi, v−i) = vi · xi(vi, v−i)−
∫ vi
0 xi(u, v−i)du.
Our new auction for public budget model is presented in Auction 1. Here we assume that
vn+1 = 0 if occurs.
Auction 1: Auction for Public Budgets
input : n agents with valuations v1 ≥ . . . ≥ vn and corresponding budgets
B1, . . . , Bn
output: An allocation (x1, . . . , xn) and corresponding payments (p1, . . . , pn)
begin
Let k ∈ [n] be the maximum integer s.t. 1
ϕ
∑k
j=1Bj ≤ vk;
if 1
ϕ
∑k
j=1Bj ≥ vk+1 then
for i = 1 to k do
vˆi ←
vi∑k
j=1 Bj
;
xi ←
Bi∑k
j=1Bj
min{vˆi, 1};
for i = k + 1 to n do
xi ← 0;
else
for i = 1 to k do
vˆi ←
vi
ϕvk+1
;
xi ←
Bi
ϕvk+1
min{vˆi, 1};
xk+1 ←
1
ϕ
−
∑k
i=1
Bi
ϕ2vk+1
;
for i = k + 2 to n do
xi ← 0;
for i = 1 to n do
pi ← vi · xi(vi, v−i)−
∫ vi
0 xi(u, v−i)du; // Myerson’s Payment Rule
Firstly, we verify that this is indeed a well-defined auction, namely the total amount of good
it allocates does not exceed one unit.
If 1
ϕ
∑k
j=1Bj ≥ vk+1,
n∑
i=1
xi =
k∑
i=1
xi =
k∑
i=1
Bi∑k
j=1Bj
min{vˆi, 1} ≤
k∑
i=1
Bi∑k
j=1Bj
= 1.
If 1
ϕ
∑k
j=1Bj < vk+1,
n∑
i=1
xi =
k∑
i=1
xi + xk+1 =
k∑
i=1
Bi
ϕvk+1
min{vˆi, 1} +
1
ϕ
−
k∑
i=1
Bi
ϕ2vk+1
≤
k∑
i=1
Bi
ϕvk+1
+ 1−
k∑
i=1
Bi
ϕvk+1
= 1.
Theorem 2.2. For public budget model and linear valuations, Auction 1 is a truthful, budget
feasible mechanism with approximation ratio of at most ϕ for liquid welfare.
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These properties shall be proved in the following two subsections. The following notations
are used in the whole section. Let k be as defined in Auction 1, p0 = max{
∑k
i=1Bi, ϕvk+1},
and k1 be the maximum integer s.t. vk1 ≥ p0. For agent i ∈ [n] let vˆi =
vi
p0
, which is as
defined in Auction 1. We call instances with 1
ϕ
∑k
j=1Bj ≥ vk+1 of case I and instances with
1
ϕ
∑k
j=1Bj < vk+1 of case II. In most of our analysis, we distinguish these two cases and prove
them separately. We have the following facts by the rule of our auction:
• In case I, v1 ≥ · · · ≥ vk1 ≥ p0 ≥ vk1+1 ≥ · · · ≥ vk ≥
p0
ϕ
≥ vk+1 ≥ · · · ≥ vn;
• In case II, v1 ≥ · · · ≥ vk1 ≥ p0 ≥ vk1+1 ≥ · · · ≥ vk+1 =
p0
ϕ
≥ vk+2 ≥ · · · ≥ vn.
Thus vˆi ≥ 1 for i = 1, 2, . . . , k1 and vˆi ∈ [
1
ϕ
, 1) for i = k1 + 1, k1 + 2, . . . , k.
2.1 Truthfulness and Budget Feasibility
By Myerson’s Lemma, we only need to verify that the allocation function in our auction is
monotone as our payment is already determined by Myerson’s integration.
Lemma 2.3. (Monotonicity) The allocation function in Auction 1 is monotone, i.e., vi →
xi(vi, v−i) is non-decreasing.
Proof. For case I, only the first k agents get non-zero unit of the item, thus we only need to
prove that for these agents, one’s share is non-decreasing if one increases her/his bid. This
is obvious since allocation xi =
Bi∑k
j=1Bj
min{vˆi, 1} =
Bi∑k
j=1 Bj
min{ vi∑k
j=1Bj
, 1} of agent i is a
monotone non-decreasing function in vi.
Now we assume that we are in case II where only the first k + 1 agents get non-zero unit
of the item. By the same argument as above, the first k agents get no less unit of the item if
she/he increases her/his bid. We prove that this also holds for the (k + 1)-th agent.
For agent k+1, as she/he continues to increase her/his value and keep the (k+1)-th place,
her/his allocation will increase, since it is xk+1 =
1
ϕ
−
∑k
j=1
Bj
ϕ2vk+1
. We consider the following
two cases when vk+1 increases further:
• 1
ϕ
∑k+1
j=1 Bj ≤ vk. In this case, the value of vk+1 first reaches
1
ϕ
∑k+1
j=1 Bj when in-
creasing and her/his allocation is updated to
Bk+1∑k+1
j=1 Bj
min{vˆk+1, 1} =
1
ϕ
·
Bk+1∑k+1
j=1 Bj
=
1
ϕ
− 1
ϕ2
∑k
j=1
Bj
vk+1
. After that, this becomes an instance of case I and the allocation
continues to increase as vk+1 increases.
• 1
ϕ
∑k+1
j=1 Bj > vk. In this case, the value of vk+1 first reaches vk when increasing, and
displace player k to be the kth highest value. Then one of the following things will
happen:
– If 1
ϕ
(
∑k−1
j=1 Bj + Bk+1) > vk, since
1
ϕ
∑k−1
j=1 Bj <
1
ϕ
∑k
j=1Bj < vk, it is still an
instance of case II and this agent k + 1 is still the last agent in the winner set. The
only difference is that the agent k is not longer in the winner set and therefore the
allocation xk+1 gets updated to
1
ϕ
− 1
ϕ2
∑k−1
j=1
Bj
vk
≥ 1
ϕ
− 1
ϕ2
∑k
j=1
Bj
vk
.
– If 1
ϕ
(
∑k−1
j=1 Bj + Bk+1) ≤ vk, then it is still an instance of case II but with agent k
as the last agent in the winner set. Agent k + 1 become the second-to-last agent in
the winner set and the allocation xk+1 gets updated to
Bk+1
ϕvk
min{vˆk+1, 1} ≥
Bk+1
ϕ2vk
≥
1
ϕ
− 1
ϕ2
∑k
j=1
Bj
vk
.
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In both cases, the allocation is non-decreasing.
This concludes the proof of truthfulness of our auction.
Lemma 2.4. (Budget feasibility) The payments defined in Auction 1 do not exceed the budgets.
Proof. For agents i > k in case I and agents i > k+1 in case II, this is trivial since they do not
get any good and pay nothing. For first k agents in both case I and case II, their allocation do
not change when they increase their valuations beyond vi ≥ p0. In other words, their allocation
is a constant when vi ≥ p0. Thus, their payments are bounded by p0xi = p0
Bi
p0
min{vˆi, 1} ≤
Bi. The only remaining case is the (k + 1)-th agent in case II. The payment is bounded by
vk+1xk+1 = vk+1(
1
ϕ
−
∑k
i=1
Bi
ϕ2vk+1
) ≤ 1
ϕ
Bk+1, where the inequality derives from the definition
of k. This completes the proof.
2.2 Approximation Ratio Analysis
Before we prove the approximation ratio, we obtain some bounds for the optimal liquid
welfare. We refer to the optimal liquid welfare as OPT = maxxW (x). If we know all the
information, the optimal can be computed by a simple greedy.
Lemma 2.5. ( [9]) The optimal liquid welfare OPT occurs at x¯∗i = min(
Bi
vi
, [1 −
∑
j<i x¯
∗
j ]
+),
where [x]+ = max(0, x).
From this, it is easy to verify that the following expression for any j ∈ [n − 1] gives upper
bounds for OPT , which holds even if 1−
∑j
i=1
Bi
vi
< 0:
OPT ≤
j∑
i=1
Bi + vj+1(1−
j∑
i=1
Bi
vi
). (1)
We propose our analysis of approximation ratio by the following lemma:
Lemma 2.6. The liquid welfare achieved by Auction 1 is at least 1
ϕ
·OPT .
Proof. We prove for case I first. For i ≤ k1, since vi ≥ p0, we have vixi =
Bivi∑k
j=1Bj
≥ Bi. For
k1 < i ≤ k we have vixi =
Bivi∑k
j=1 Bj
min{vˆi, 1} ≥ vˆ
2
iBi as vˆi ∈ [
1
ϕ
, 1) for k1 < i ≤ k. Thus
W (x) =
k1∑
i=1
Bi +
k∑
i=k1+1
Bivˆ
2
i .
For optimal liquid welfare, we shall prove that
OPT ≤
k∑
i=1
Bi + (1−
k∑
i=k1+1
Bi
vi
)
1
ϕ
p0 = ϕ
k1∑
i=1
Bi +
k∑
i=k1+1
Bi(ϕ−
1
ϕvˆi
).
The equality part is by substituting p0 =
∑k
i=1Bi, vˆi =
vi∑k
j=1Bj
and direct calculation. We
prove the inequality by a case analysis in the following.
•
∑k
i=k1+1
Bi
vi
≤
∑k
i=1
Bi
vi
≤ 1. We use the bound (1) for OPT with j = k and the fact that
vk+1 ≤
1
ϕ
p0:
OPT ≤
k∑
i=1
Bi + vk+1(1−
k∑
i=1
Bi
vi
) ≤
k∑
i=1
Bi + vk+1(1−
k∑
i=k1+1
Bi
vi
)
≤
k∑
i=1
Bi + (1−
k∑
i=k1+1
Bi
vi
)
1
ϕ
p0
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•
∑k
i=k1+1
Bi
vi
≤ 1 <
∑k
i=1
Bi
vi
. Then in the optimal solution, first k agents are not fully
occupied(which means in the optimal solution, agent k’s budget is not used up). Thus
nothing is allocated for agents i ≥ k + 1. In this case, we have OPT ≤
∑k
i=1Bi ≤∑k
i=1Bi + (1−
∑k
i=k1+1
Bi
vi
) 1
ϕ
p0 as the last term is non-negative.
• 1 <
∑k
i=k1+1
Bi
vi
≤
∑k
i=1
Bi
vi
. We use the bound (1) for OPT with j = k − 1:
OPT ≤
k−1∑
i=1
Bi + (1−
k−1∑
i=1
Bi
vi
)vk =
k∑
i=1
Bi + (1−
k∑
i=1
Bi
vi
)vk
≤
k∑
i=1
Bi + (1−
k∑
i=k1+1
Bi
vi
)vk
≤
k∑
i=1
Bi + (1−
k∑
i=k1+1
Bi
vi
)
1
ϕ
p0.
The last inequality uses the fact that (1−
∑k
i=k1+1
Bi
vi
) < 0 and vk ≥
1
ϕ
p0.
To bound the liquid welfare of our auction, we need to give a good bound for vˆ2i for agents
i ∈ [k1 + 1, k]. Noticing that for these agents, vˆi ∈ [
1
ϕ
, 1], we shall prove that vˆ2i ≥
1
ϕ
(ϕ − 1
ϕvˆi
).
To prove this, consider the following function
f(t) =
ϕ− 1
ϕt
t2
, t ∈ [
1
ϕ
, 1].
The derivative of f(t) is
f ′(t) = −2
ϕ
t3
+ 3
1
ϕt4
=
1
t4
[
3
ϕ
− 2ϕt] ≤ 0 when t ∈ [
1
ϕ
, 1].
So f(t) is monotone decreasing in interval [ 1
ϕ
, 1], and fmax = f(
1
ϕ
) = ϕ.
By the property of f and the fact that vˆi ∈ [
1
ϕ
, 1) for i = k1 + 1, k1 + 2, . . . , k, it is obvious
that ∀i ∈ [k1 + 1, k], vˆ
2
i ≥
1
ϕ
(ϕ− 1
ϕvˆi
). Thus
W (x) ≥
k1∑
i=1
Bi +
k∑
i=k1+1
Bivˆ
2
i ≥
k1∑
i=1
Bi +
k∑
i=k1+1
Bi
1
ϕ
(ϕ−
1
ϕvˆi
)
=
1
ϕ
(ϕ
k1∑
i=1
Bi +
k∑
i=k1+1
Bi(ϕ−
1
ϕvˆi
))
≥
1
ϕ
OPT.
This completes the proof for instances of case I and now we prove for instances of case II.
For i ≤ k1 since vi ≥ ϕvk+1 we have vixi = vi
Bi
ϕvk+1
min{vˆi, 1} ≥ Bi. For k1 < i ≤ k we have
vixi = vi
Bi
ϕvk+1
min{vˆi, 1} =
vˆiBi
ϕvk+1
vˆiϕvk+1 = vˆ
2
iBi < Bi. For i = k + 1 we have
vk+1xk+1 = vk+1(
1
ϕ
−
k∑
i=1
Bi
ϕ2vk+1
) ≤
1
ϕ2
Bk+1 < Bk+1.
where the first inequality derives from the definition of k.
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Thus, we can bound the liquid welfare as follows
W (x) =
k1∑
i=1
Bi +
k∑
i=k1+1
Bivˆ
2
i + vk+1xk+1
=
k1∑
i=1
Bi +
k∑
i=k1+1
Bivˆ
2
i +
1
ϕ
vk+1 −
1
ϕ2
k1∑
i=1
Bi −
1
ϕ2
k∑
i=k1+1
Bi
= (1−
1
ϕ2
)
k1∑
i=1
Bi +
1
ϕ
vk+1 +
k∑
i=k1+1
Bi(vˆi
2 −
1
ϕ2
).
For optimal liquid welfare, we use our bound (1) with j = k to get
OPT ≤
k∑
i=1
Bi + (1−
k∑
i=k1+1
Bi
vi
)vk+1 =
k1∑
i=1
Bi + vk+1 +
k∑
i=k1+1
Bi(1−
1
ϕvˆi
),
where the equality part is by substituting vˆi =
vi
ϕvk+1
and direct calculation. To bound the
liquid welfare of our auction, we need to give a good bound for vˆ2i for agents i ∈ [k1 + 1, k].
Noticing that for these agents, vˆi ∈ [
1
ϕ
, 1], we shall prove that vˆ2i −
1
ϕ2
≥ 1
ϕ
(1 − 1
φvˆi
). To prove
this, consider the following function
g(t) = (t2 −
1
ϕ2
)/(1 −
1
ϕt
) = (t+
1
ϕ
)t, t ∈ [
1
ϕ
, 1].
It is clear that g is monotone increasing on t in the interval [ 1
ϕ
, 1], so gmin = g(
1
ϕ
) = 2 1
ϕ2
> 1
ϕ
.
By the property of g and the fact that vˆi ∈ [
1
ϕ
, 1) for i = k1 + 1, k1 + 2, . . . , k, it is obvious
that ∀i ∈ [k1 + 1, k], vˆ
2
i −
1
ϕ2
≥ 1
ϕ
(1− 1
φvˆi
). Thus
W (x) = (1−
1
ϕ2
)
k1∑
i=1
Bi +
1
ϕ
vk+1 +
k∑
i=k1+1
Bi(vˆ
2
i −
1
ϕ2
)
>
1
ϕ
k1∑
i=1
Bi +
1
ϕ
vk+1 +
1
ϕ
k∑
i=k1+1
Bi(1−
1
ϕvˆi
)
≥
1
ϕ
OPT.
This completes the proof for approximation ratio.
To conclude this section, here we provide the following example showing that the analysis
of our auction is tight.
Example 2.7. (Tightness) Consider two agents with profiles v1 = 1, B1 = ǫ and v2 =
1
ϕ
,
B2 = 1 − ǫ where ǫ ∈ (0, 1). It is easy to verify that OPT = ǫ + (1 − ǫ)
1
ϕ
. For Auction 1,
W (x) = B1 +B2
1
ϕ2
= ǫ+ (1− ǫ) 1
ϕ2
. When ǫ→ 0, W (x) = 1
ϕ
OPT
3 Private Budget
In this section, we deal with the setting that agents’ budgets are private information that
the auctioneer must design a mechanism which incentives agents to report their true values and
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budgets. We also study the general case that the valuation function vi(·) for each agent i could
be any monotone non-decreasing function.
For a subset of agents Q ⊆ [n], let OPT (Q) denote the optimal liquid welfare for agents in
group Q. Formally OPT (Q) = maxx
∑
i∈Qmin{vi(xi), Bi}. In particular, let OPT = OPT ([n])
which is our objective in this setting.
Our new auction for private budget model is presented in Auction 2, where the parameters
γ > 1, 0 < β < 12 and 0 ≤ µ ≤ 1 shall be specified later.
Basically, it is a combination of the following three basic auctions:
• With probability of µ3 , we run the first modified Vickrey auction. Agent i1 with highest
v¯i = min{vi(1), Bi} gets the total unit of the good and needs to pay pi1 = γv¯i2 > v¯i2
, which is strictly higher than the second highest v¯i. If agent i1 is not willing to pay
(vi1 < γv¯i2) or does not have enough budget to pay (Bi1 < γv¯i2), we simply refuse to sell
the item to any one.
• With probability of 2µ3 , we run the second modified Vickrey auction. Agents are randomly
divided into two groups S and T . We only sell the total unit of the good to the first agent
(with a prior fixed order) in group S who is willing and able to pay the price maxi∈T v¯i
γ
. If
there is no such agent in group S, we simply refuse to sell the item to any one.
• With the remaining probability of 1− µ, we run a random sampling auction. Agents are
randomly divided into two groups S and T . We sell half of the good to agents in group
S with fixed price βOPT (T ) per unit. More precisely, for each agent in group S with
a prior fixed order, we simply offer a price βOPT (T ) per unit and let the agent get the
most profitable fraction of the good within the availability of the good and budget of the
agent. This is precisely captured by the expression
xi ← argmax
x≤min{xS , BiβOPT (T )}
{vi(x)− βOPT (T )x}.
If there are multiple x that achieve the maximum, we choose the largest one. We do the
same thing for agents in T but with price βOPT (S).
We call the combination of the first two auctions the modified Vickrey auction and the third
part as the random sampling auction.
Theorem 3.1. Choosing β = 310 , γ =
√
10
9 and µ =
5
7 , Auction 2 is a truthful, budget feasible
mechanism which guarantees liquid welfare of at least 134OPT .
3.1 Truthfulness and Budget Feasibility
Before we prove that our auction is truthful, we first point out that the ordinarily Vickrey
auction (i.e. γ = 1) on v¯i = min{vi(1), Bi} is not truthful. Here is an example in which
the valuation function is additive (thus we use vi to denote price per unit to illustrate): two
agents with profiles (v1, B1) = (v2, B2) = (2, 1). If both of the agents bid truthfully, whatever
the tie-breaking rule the Vickrey auction uses (even if we allow randomness), at least for one
of the agents, the probability she/he gets the total unit of good is strictly less than 1. For
symmetry, we assume that the probability agent 1 gets the total unit of good is strictly less
than 1. When agent 1 does get some fraction of the good, she/he needs to pay 1 per unit
according to the Vickrey’s rule. As a result, the expected utility of agent 1 is strictly less than
2− 1 = 1. However, if agent 1 bids (v′1, B
′
1) = (2, 1.5), she/he will get the total unit of the good
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Auction 2: Random Sampling Auction for Private Budgets
input : n agents with values v1, . . . , vn and budgets B1, . . . , Bn
output: An allocation (x1, . . . , xn) and corresponding payments (p1, . . . , pn);
begin
for i = 1 to n do
xi ← 0, pi ← 0, v¯i ← min{vi(1), Bi};
With probability of µ3 begin
i1 ← argmaxi v¯i, i2 ← argmaxi 6=i1 v¯i;
if v¯i1 ≥ γv¯i2 then
xi1 ← 1, pi1 ← γv¯i2
With probability of 2µ3 begin
Randomly divide all agents with equal probability into set S and T ;
v¯T ← maxi∈T v¯i;
forall the i ∈ S do
if v¯i ≥
v¯T
γ
then
xi ← 1, pi ←
v¯T
γ
;
Halt
With probability of 1− µ begin
Randomly divide all agents with equal probability into set S and T , xS ←
1
2 ,
xT ←
1
2 ;
forall the i ∈ S do
xi ← argmax
x≤min{xS , BiβOPT (T )}
{vi(x)− βOPT (T )x};
pi ← βOPT (T )xi;
xS ← xS − xi
forall the i ∈ T do
xi ← argmax
x≤min{xT , BiβOPT (S)}
{vi(x)− βOPT (S)x};
pi ← βOPT (S)xi;
xT ← xT − xi
for sure based on Vickrey auction and the payment is still 1, which does not exceed the budget.
Therefore, her/his utility become 1, which is strictly better than bidding truthfully.
This is the reason why we need to modify the Vickrey auction. In the following, we prove
that Auction 2 in which our modification is applied, is universally truthful.
Lemma 3.2. Auction 2 is universally truthful.
Proof. The auction is a probabilistic combination of three auctions. For the second and third
auctions, it also uses random bits to do the partition of (S, T ). We only need to prove that all
of them are truthful when these partitions are fixed.
For the first modified Vickrey auction on value v¯i = min{vi(1), Bi}, two cases may happen:
• v¯i1 ≥ γv¯i2 . In this case, for any agent j other than i1, v¯j ≤ v¯i1 < v¯i1γ. If j wants to change
her/his bid to become the winner, she/he needs to pay v¯i1γ, which is strictly greater than
either her/his true budget or true value. This leads to not enough budget or negative
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utility. For i1, she/he does not have the incentive to change value or budget, since the
payment is decided by i2, which is no larger than her/his value and also within her/his
budget.
• v¯i1 < γv¯i2 . In this case, no one is the winner. For any agent j other than i1, it is the same
argument as before. For i1, if she/he wants to change her/his bid to become the winner,
then she/he needs to pay γv¯i2 , which is strictly greater than either her/his true budget or
true value. This leads to not enough budget or negative utility.
Now we prove for the second modified Vickrey auction. For any agent in T , she/he does
not get any fraction of the good regardingless of her/his bid. So, they do not have incentive
to lie. For any agent in S, she/he cannot change the price per unit or her/his position in the
order by changing her/his bid. When an agent in S has chance to get the good, it is simply a
take-it-or-leave-it offer with fixed price. So, they do not have incentive to lie.
For the random sampling auction part, each agent cannot change her/his price per unit or
position by changing her/his bid, and given a fixed price and position, a agent has already got
the most profitable fraction of the good. Therefore, agents do not have incentive to change their
bids.
Thus, all the three auctions above are truthful. This concludes the proof for universally
truthfulness.
Lemma 3.3. Auction 2 is budget feasible.
Proof. For the first modified Vickrey auction, if no one wins, everyone’s payment is zero; if i1
wins, then she/he pays γv¯i2 ≤ v¯i1 = min{vi1(1), Bi1} ≤ Bi1 . For the second modified Vickrey
auction, if no one wins, everyone’s payment is zero; if i∗ wins, then she/he pays γ v¯T
γ
≤ v¯i∗ =
min{vi∗(1), Bi∗} ≤ Bi∗ .
For random sampling auction and agent i ∈ S, pi = xi · βOPT (T ) ≤ min{xS ,
Bi
βOPT (T )} ·
βOPT (T ) ≤ Bi
βOPT (T ) · βOPT (T ) = Bi. Same thing also holds for agents in T .
This concludes the proof for budget feasibility.
3.2 Approximation Ratio Analysis
We first prove the following lemma, which bounds the liquid welfare of the auction by its
revenue. This is useful in our analysis.
Lemma 3.4. Liquid welfare produced by any truthful and budget feasible mechanism is at least
the revenue of the auctioneer.
Proof. For an allocation x = (x1, x2, . . . , xn) and payment p = (p1, p2, . . . , pn) given by such a
mechanism, we have vi(xi) ≥ pi by truthfulness and Bi ≥ pi by budget feasibility. So the liquid
welfare W (x) =
∑
imin{vi(xi), Bi} ≥
∑
i pi.
Based on Lemma 3.4, we prove that the modified Vickrey auction part performs well when
maxi v¯i is large.
Lemma 3.5. Let γ =
√
10
9 . Then the modified Vickrey auction part get expect liquid welfare of
3µ
10 maxi v¯i.
We note that by choosing γ arbitrarily close to 1, we can get liquid welfare arbitrarily close
to µ3 maxi v¯i. We choose the above value for the notational simplicity of the presentation.
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Proof. If the highest two v¯i are not relatively close to each other, namely v¯i1 ≥ γv¯i2 (i1, i2 are
as defined in Auction 2). Then the first modified Vickrey auction successes and gets expect
liquid welfare of µ3 maxi v¯i >
3µ
10 maxi v¯i.
If the highest two v¯i are relatively close to each other, namely v¯i1 < γv¯i2 . Then in the second
modified Vickrey auction, with probability 12 these two agents i1, i2 are put into different groups.
When this event occurs, the second modified Vickrey successes and gains a revenue of at least
maxi v¯i
γ2
. According to Lemma 3.4, liquid welfare extract by the second modified auction is greater
than this revenue, thus contributes at least maxi v¯i
γ2
liquid welfare. Therefore, the expect liquid
welfare in this case is at least 2µ3
1
2
maxi v¯i
γ2
= 3µ10 maxi v¯i.
If maxi v¯i is already a significant fraction of the optimal solution, we are already done. In
the following, we shall prove that the random sampling auction performs well when maxi v¯i is
small. We first give some definitions. Let v¯i(x) = min{vi(x), Bi} be the capped valuation for
agent i. Then, for any allocation x = (x1, . . . , xn) , we have W (x) =
∑
i v¯i(xi). The following
notion plays an important role in our analysis. We define
Di(p) = argmax
x≤1
{v¯i(x)− xp}.
If there are multiple x that achieve the maximum, we choose the largest one. It is very crucial
that we use v¯i(x) rather than vi(x) in the definition of Di(p). By this definition, we can directly
see that for any p > 0 and x < Di(p), we have Di(p) ≤
Bi
p
and vi(x) < Bi. This Di(p) also
gives a lower bound of agent i’s demand if there are enough availability of the good. Formally,
we have the following lemma.
Lemma 3.6. Let p > 0 and Di(p) ≤ X. Then
argmax
x≤min{X,Bi
p
}
{v(x) − xp} ≥ Di(p).
Proof. The left hand side of the inequality is agent i’s most profitable fraction given price p per
unit and the total availability of good of X. For x < Di(p) ≤ min(X,
Bi
p
), we have
v(x)− xp = v¯i(x)− xp ≤ v¯i(Di(p))−Di(p)p ≤ vi(Di(p))−Di(p)p.
The first equality uses the fact that vi(x) < Bi for x < Di(p); the first inequality uses the
definition of Di(p); and the last inequality uses the fact that v¯i(x) ≤ vi(x) for any x. Since
we always break ties in favor of larger x, the maximum of v(x) − xp in the LHS is archived by
x ≥ Di(p). This completes the proof.
Let W (p) =
∑
i v¯i(Di(p)). The intuition for this notion is that with fixed price p, W (p)
gives the maximum liquid welfare from all agents. We present the following lemma giving an
lower bound for this notion using OPT and fixed price p.
Lemma 3.7. For any p ≥ 0, W (p) ≥ OPT − p.
Proof. Let (x1, . . . , xn) be an instance of optimal allocation. By the definition of Di(p), we have
v¯i(Di(p))−Di(p)p ≥ v¯i(xi)−xip , and thus v¯i(Di(p)) ≥ v¯i(xi)−xip. Sum up these inequalities
for all i ∈ [n], we get
∑
i
v¯i(Di(p)) ≥
∑
i
(v¯i(xi)− xip) = OPT − p
∑
i
xi ≥ OPT − p.
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The following facts on relationship between OPT (S), OPT (S) and OPT , are obvious.
Lemma 3.8. Let (S, T ) be a partition of [n]. Then OPT (S) ≤ OPT , OPT (T ) ≤ OPT and
OPT (S) +OPT (T ) ≥ OPT .
By choosing p = βOPT in Lemma 3.7, we get that
W (βOPT ) =
∑
i
v¯i(Di(βOPT )) ≥ OPT − βOPT = (1− β)OPT.
This is a constant fraction of OPT . Since OPT (S), OPT (T ) ≤ OPT , the fraction of good
demanded by agent i in the random sampling auction is at least Di(βOPT ) by Lemma 3.6
providing that there are enough fraction of the good remains. This is a good approximation
of the optimal liquid welfare when each of v¯i(Di(βOPT )) is small. Let W = W (βOPT ),
WS =
∑
i∈S v¯i(Di(βOPT )) and WT =
∑
i∈T v¯i(Di(βOPT )). We first prove that both sets S
and T get significant amount of demands at fixed price βOPT with high probability in this
case.
Lemma 3.9. If maxi∈[n] v¯i(Di(βOPT )) ≤ α ·OPT , then
Pr(WS ,WT ≥
β
2
OPT ) ≥ 1−
α(1 − β)
(1− 2β)2
.
Proof. Let Ii to the random indicator variable for the event i ∈ S. ThenWS =
∑
i∈S v¯i(Di(βOPT )) =∑
i∈[n] v¯i(Di(βOPT ))Ii, E(WS) =
1
2W and
Var(WS) =
∑
i∈S
Var(v¯i(Di(βOPT ))Ii) =
∑
i∈S
(E((v¯i(Di(βOPT ))Ii)
2)− E(v¯i(Di(βOPT ))Ii)
2)
=
∑
i∈S
1
4
(v¯i(Di(βOPT )))
2
≤
W
αOPT
·
1
4
· (αOPT )2
=
1
4
αWOPT,
where the inequality uses the fact that maxi∈V v¯i(Di(βOPT )) ≤ αOPT .
By Chebyshev’s Inequality, we have:
Pr(
β
2
OPT ≤WS ≤W −
β
2
OPT ) = Pr(|WS − E(WS)| ≤
W − βOPT
2
)
≥ 1−
Var(WS)
(W−βOPT2 )
2
≥ 1−
αWOPT
(W − βOPT )2
≥ 1−
α(1 − β)
(1− 2β)2
,
where the last inequality uses the fact that W ≥ (1− β)OPT . Since WS +WT =W , the event
of (β2OPT ≤WS ≤W −
β
2OPT ) is the same as the event of (WS ,WT ≥
β
2 opt). This completes
the proof.
The following lemma gives a bound of liquid welfare for the random sampling auction part.
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Lemma 3.10. If maxi v¯i = α · OPT , then the random sampling auction part gets at least
expected liquid welfare of (1− µ)(1− α(1−β)
(1−2β)2 )(
1
2 −
α
β
)βOPT .
Proof. Since maxi∈[n] v¯i(Di(βOPT )) ≤ maxi v¯i = α · OPT , by Lemma 3.9 we know that
Pr(WS ,WT ≥
β
2OPT ) ≥ 1 −
α(1−β)
(1−2β)2 . We only bound the liquid welfare when this good
event (WS ,WT ≥
β
2OPT ) occurs, which occurs with probability (1−
α(1−β)
(1−2β)2 ).
Not only v¯i(Di(βOPT )) is bounded from above, Di(βOPT ) is also bounded from above.
From the definition of Di(·), we know that v¯i(Di(βOPT ))− βOPTDi(βOPT ) ≥ 0. Therefore,
Di(βOPT ) ≤
v¯i(Di(βOPT ))
βOPT
≤
α
β
.
We first consider liquid welfare obtained by agents in T . If every agent i ∈ T gets at least
vi(Di(βOPT )) fraction of good, then the total liquid welfare of our auction is at least WT ≥
β
2 opt. Otherwise, due to Lemma 3.6, it must be the case that there is not enough good remains.
Since Di(βOPT ) ≤
α
β
, we know that at least 12 −
α
β
fraction of the good is sold. This extracts a
revenue of (12−
α
β
)βOPT (S) and thus also liquid welfare of this amount by Lemma 3.4. Put these
two cases together, the liquid welfare for group T in our auction is at least min{β2OPT, (
1
2 −
α
β
)βOPT (S)} = (12−
α
β
)βOPT (S). By similar argument, the liquid welfare from agents in group
S is at least (12 −
α
β
)βOPT (T ).
To sum up, the total expected liquid welfare is at least
(1− µ)(1−
α(1− β)
(1− 2β)2
)(
1
2
−
α
β
)β(OPT (S) +OPT (T )) ≥ (1− µ)(1−
α(1− β)
(1− 2β)2
)(
1
2
−
α
β
)βOPT.
Finally, we estimate the approximation ratio of Auction 2.
Lemma 3.11. Choosing β = 310 , γ =
√
10
9 and µ =
5
7 , the approximation ratio of Auction 2 is
at most 34.
Proof. Assume that maxi v¯i = α · OPT . By Lemma 3.5 and Lemma 3.10, the total expected
liquid welfare is at least
(
3µ
10
α+ (1− µ)(1 −
α(1− β)
(1− 2β)2
)(
1
2
−
α
β
)β
)
OPT.
Substitute β, µ with the above specified value and simplify, the above expression is (54α
2 −
29
112α +
3
70)OPT . One can easily check that the minimum of this expression is greater than
1
34OPT , thus our auction has an approximation ratio of at most 34.
3.3 Robustness of the Auction
Our auction is rather robust in terms of the setting. We do not have any requirement about
the valuation functions. Technically, in the presentation we still use the assumption that the
valuation function is monotone. In most of the cases, this is true or without loss of generality
since the agent can simply discard certain amount of the good. Even if this is not the case,
we can also easily modify the auction to be compatible with possible non-monotone valuation
functions. The only place we need to modify is that when the current auction assigns the total
unit of the good to an agent, it assigns the most valuable fraction to her/him and discard the
remaining.
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For the simplicity of the presentation, we assume that the good is divisible. Our auction is
also good if the items are not continuously divisible. For example, the mechanism works for the
multi-unit auction even if each unit of the good is not divisible.
Another issue has not been discussed is the computational complexity of the auction as
we mainly focus on the approximation ratio caused by the truthfulness and budget feasibility
constrain. The computational complexity depends on how to represent the input valuation
functions. If these are linear valuations and each can be simply represented by a single number,
our auction is indeed efficient. If the valuation functions are given as generic value oracles, then
it is even intractable to computable the most profitable fraction for an agent given a fixed price.
So, a reasonable assumption is that valuation functions are given by demand oracles or in some
concise representation. Then the main problematic step is to compute the optimal solution
for an off line instance. This could be at least NP-hard even for some concise representations.
For example, we can easily encode knapsack problem here. Then, another robustness of the
auction is that it still works well when we replace the optimal solution with some constant
approximation. Therefore, as long as we can design an polynomial time algorithm with constant
approximation ratio for the off line optimization problem, we can design an auction, which is
truthful, budget feasible, of constant approximation and polynomial time computable.
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